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Kronenberg: Search and Seizure

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
KINGS COUNTY
People v. Ortiz'
(decided August 20, 2001)
On July 9, 2001, a Wade,2 Payton,3 Dunaway4 hearing was
held with respect to defendant Ortiz's motion to suppress evidence
of identification testimony on the ground that the police unlawfully
entered his home and arrested him without probable cause or a
warrant.5 The court granted Ortiz's motion to suppress the
testimony of Police Officer Stephen Hom and the complainant
regarding observations they made while inside the defendant's
home, including any out-of-court identification made of the
defendant. However, the court denied the defendant's motion to
suppress any in-court identification by the complainant.6
The defendant's motion to suppress the testimony of Police
Officer Hom and the complainant was based upon the protections
afforded to individuals against unreasonable search and seizure as
'No. 8364-00, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 337 (Sup. Ct. Kings County August
20, 2001).
2 U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). See People v. Dixon, 85 N.Y.2d 218,
222; 647 N.E.2d 1321, 1323; 623 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (1995) (holding that the
purpose of a Wade hearing is "to test identification testimony for taint arising
from official suggestion during police-arranged confrontations between a
defendant and an eyewitness." citing People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543,
552, 399 N.E.2d 924, 930, 423 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1979)).
3 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). See In the Matter of Demetrius
W., 126 Misc. 2d 440, 443, 481 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (N.Y. Family Ct. 1984)
(stating that "the Payton rule prohibits the police from making a warrantless and
nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony
arrest").
4 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). See Dawson v. Donnelly,
111
F. Supp. 2d 239 (W.D.N.Y 2000) (stating that as per Dunaway, a confession
obtained after an arrest without probable cause was inadmissible at trial).
5rtiz,2001 N.Y Misc. LEXIS 337 at *1.
6 Id. Police Officer Hom was one of four officers
to arrive at the defendant's
home. Officer Hom waited outside after the defendant's stepdaughter invited the
other three officers in. After being summoned by one of the officers already in
the defendant's home, Officer Hom and the complainant entered the defendant's
home without permission of the defendant or any other person residing in the
household. Id.
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set forth in the Federal 7 and New York State8 Constitutions. 9 The
Ortiz court held that the warrantless entry into the defendant's
home by the initial three initial officers was lawful.'0 However, the
warrantless entry into the defendant's home by Officer Hom,
accompanied by the complainant was a violation of the defendant's
right to be free from
federal" and state 2 constitutional
3
seizures.'
and
searches
unreasonable
Police initially responded to a radio run of a past assault in
Brooklyn.' 4 Upon their arrival at the scene, the officers were
approached by a 14 year old complainant, Hector Ramos, who
informed them that an "intoxicated older male Hispanic wearing
blue jeans and a gray T-shirt approached him on the street about
ten minutes prior, unzipped Ramos' pants, and fondled his
penis."' 5 Ramos informed the police that the man who assaulted6
him went into a residential building located on Seventh Avenue.'
Police Officer Caesar, Police Officer Wolf, and Sergeant Walton
approached the building described by Ramos and knocked on the
front door.' 7 A teenaged girl opened the door and the officers
described the suspect.' 8 She informed the officers that the
description they gave her was of her stepfather.'9 The police asked
her if they could speak with her stepfather and she said "yes," and

CONST. amend. IV provides in pertinent part: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated ......
7U.S.

8 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 which provides in pertinent part: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ......
Ortiz, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 337 at *6.
O
10 Ortiz, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 337 at *4 ("[T]heir entry was based on
the
express and voluntary consent of the teenaged occupant who answered the door
and identified herself to the officers as the defendant's stepdaughter.").
"1U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
13Ortiz, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
337 at *6.
1Id.
at *1.
151d.
'6

Id. at *2.

17id.

' Ortiz, 2001
'9Id. at *3.

N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 337 at **2-3.
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invited the three officers inside the apartment. 20 Officer Hom was
waiting outside with the complainant and brought the complainant
into the house to the room where the defendant was sitting. 2'
Neither the defendant nor his stepdaughter, nor any other member
of the defendant's household had given Officer Hom or the
complainant permission to enter the house.22 Upon seeing the
defendant, the complainant stated: "That's the guy that did it to
me."23 Ortiz was then arrested.24
The court commenced its analysis by determining that the
initial entry of the officers into the defendant's home was lawful
because the entry was based on the express and voluntary consent
of the defendant's stepdaughter.25 However, the consent granted
to the initial officers did not extend to the later entry by Officer
Horn and the complainant.26 Therefore, because the entry of the
three initial officers was lawful, they were permitted to testify as to
observations they made of the defendant. However, due to lack of
consent, neither Officer Horn nor the complainant would be
allowed to testify as to observations they made of the defendant,
including
the complainant's identification of the defendant at that
7
time.

2

In recognizing the facts of this case to be unique, the court,
stated: "research has failed to disclose a reported case where
particular police officers obtained consent to enter a home and
then, without obtaining further consent, invited other police
officers and civilians for the purpose of making an
identification., 28 The court therefore analyzed the actions of the
officers by comparing the facts of the instant case to "cases where
a suspect has consented to a search of a particular area, but the
police extended their search beyond the scope of the suspects

2

0Id.

2IId.
22

at **3-4.
Id. at *4.

23Ortiz, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 337, at *4.
24

Id.

Id at *5.
id. at *6.
27 Id. at *5.
25

26

2

Ortiz, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 337, at *6.
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consent., 29 Citing Florida v. Jimeno,30 the Ortiz court stated: "the
standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent is that of
objective reasonableness. ' 1
In Jimeno, the defendant was stopped for a traffic
violation. 2 The defendant gave the officer permission to search
the automobile, and upon doing so, the officer found a paper bag
containing cocaine.
The Jimeno Court held that "it was
objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general
consent to search respondent's car included consent to search
",34
containers within the car ....
Likewise, in People v. Mitchell,35 the defendant consented
to a search of his automobile by stating to the police, "you can look
through anything you want. It's not my car.",36 In Mitchell, the
defendant placed no limitation on the police search of the
automobile. Based on the defendant's unqualified consent, the
police were free to search the entire automobile. However, the
Ortiz court, in comparing the facts of Mitchell stated, it was
unreasonable for additional uninvited police officers and civilians
to enter the defendant's apartment simply because the defendant's
stepdaughter granted the initial officers permission to enter the
apartment. This consent was in effect consent limited to the initial
officers.38
The defendants in Jimeno and Mitchell provided the
officers with unlimited permission to search their automobiles.
However, in Ortiz the permission granted by the defendant's
stepdaughter was inherently limited to the initial officers and did
29

id.

30500 U.S. 248 (1991).
31 Ortiz, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 337 at *7.See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S.
248, 251 (1991) ( "[T]he standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent
under the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness-what would
the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the
officer
and the subject?").
3
2 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at
249.
33
34

Id. at 250.
Id. at 25 1.

35 211 A.D.2d 553, 621 N.Y.S.2d 581
36 Id. at 553, 621 N.Y.S.2d at
582.
37Id. at 554, 621 N.Y.S.2d

(1st Dep't 1995).

at 582.
Ortiz, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 337 at *7.

31
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not automatically extend to officers who did not receive the same
permission to enter the apartment. In other words, the entry of
Officer Hom and the complainant into the defendant's home was
not objectively reasonable, because a reasonable person in the
Ortiz case would have understood the conversation between the
initial officers and the stepdaughter did not extend to any other
officers or civilians. Consequently, testimony given by Officer
Hom and the complainant regarding anything that occurred inside
the defendant's home, including the complainant's identification of
the defendant, was inadmissible.
Similarly, in United States v. Snow, 4° defendant consented
to a search of his automobile by police officers. 4' Defendant sought
to suppress evidence found in the car on the ground that his
consent to a search of his car did not extend to the closed paper bag
found inside the car.42 The court held "that an individual who
consents to the search of his car should reasonably expect
that ...containers discovered inside the car will be opened and
examined," explaining that "if the consent to search is entirely
open-ended, a reasonable person would have no cause to believe
that the search will be limited in some way. 4 3 In contrast, in
Ortiz, the stepdaughter's consent to allow the first three officers to
enter into defendant's home would not lead a reasonable person to
believe that her consent would be extended to the complainant or
any later responding officers. It was not an open-ended invitation
in that her consent was directed at specific officers.
The facts of Ortiz are distinguishable from the facts in
Mitchell, Snow and Jimeno, in that the stepdaughter's consent in
Ortiz, did not apply as broadly as the consent given by the
defendants in Mitchell, Snow and Jimeno." Likewise, the court in
39Id.at

*2.
44 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 1995).
4'Id. at 134.
40

42

ld.

Id. at 135; see also People v. Flores, 181 A.D.2d 570, 581 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1st
Dep't 1992) (holding an invitation to enter a dwelling cannot reasonably be
construed as a broad consent for the police to wander at will throughout the
entire dwelling).
44see Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 ("The scope of a search
is generally defined by
its expressed object.").
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People v. Cohen 45 held that the defendant's consent to the initial
entry by police into her home to investigate a possible suicide did
not extend to the entry made by police on the following morning to
investigate what the police then believed to be a possible
homicide.46 Although the initial police entry in Cohen was based
upon the emergency doctrine, "there was no basis in the evidence
for the application of the emergency doctrine to justify re-entry."4 "
In Cohen as in Ortiz, the police exceeded the scope of permission
granted to enter a defendant's home.
The Ortiz court relied upon the holdings of the Second and
Fourth Departments in its analysis. In People v. Jakubowski,4 the
court held, "the scope of the search ... must be limited strictly to
50
the terms of the consent. 4 9 Similarly, in People v. Grajales,
investigators "obtained permission from the defendant to conduct a
limited search for immigration documents in the defendant's
home." 5 The court held that "this limited consent.., dissipated
upon the recovery of the valid passports from the dresser., 52 Since
the sole purpose of the search was to find documents pertaining to
alien status, the search should have terminated once the documents
were found.53
In conclusion, the Federal and New York State
Constitutions are essentially identical in language; providing for
the protection of individuals against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 54 Furthermore, when determining whether a police officer
exceeds the scope of a search based upon consent, both the federal
45 58 N.Y.2d 844, 446 N.E.2d 774, 460 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1983).
41Id. at 846.
47
48

id.
100 A.D.2d 112, 116,472 N.Y.S.2d 853, 857 (4th Dep't 1984).

49 id. at 116, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 586 ("[Slearches have been held invalid where

the police have exceeded the consent which was limited to a search for a
particular purpose .... ") see also Walter v. United States 447 U.S. 649 (1980)
(holding when an official search is properly authorized, whether by consent or
by the issuance of a valid warrant, the scope of the search is limited by the terms
of its authorization)..
50 136 A.D.2d 564, 523 N.Y.S.2d 560 (2d Dep't 1988).
51 Id. at 564-65, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
52
id.
53 Id. at 565, 523 N.Y.S.2d at
561.
54 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also, N.Y. CONST.
art. I § 12.
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and New York State courts rely upon the standard of objective
reasonableness. 5 In Ortiz, the court applied the standard of
objective reasonableness to an exchange between the police and an
occupant of the defendant's residence. 56 Similarly, as in Ortiz, the
New York courts in other state cases have consistently held that
searches must be limited to the terms of the consent.57 Both federal
and state law interprets the scope of police searches conducted
with consent to be controlled by the objective reasonableness
standard.m
Robert Kronenberg

55

See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251; see also Snow, 44 F.3d at 134; Mitchell, 211

A.D.2d at 554, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
See Ortiz, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 337 at *5 ("The stepdaughters limited
consent to the entry of three police officers into an apartment cannot reasonably
be deemed to be an open invitation for more police officers, and any civilians
they wished to accompany them, to enter into the premises at a future time.").
57 See Jakubowski, 100 A.D.2d at 116, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 857 ("[T]he scope
of
the search ... must be limited strictly to the terms of the consent."); see also

Mitchell, 211 A.D.2d at 554, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 582 (holding a police search of
defendant's entire vehicle to be proper because the defendant had not limited the
scope of the search).
58 See, e.g., Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, Mitchell, 211
A.D.2d at 554, 621
N.Y.S.2d 583; Snow, 44 F.3d at 138.
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